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Abstract Local markets for real estate brokerage services typically exhibit
fairly strict pricing. Increased popularity of limited service
brokerages provides an opportunity to study any loss in utility
by sellers using these ﬁrms. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
sellers experience a decreased selling price or an increased
marketing time when utilizing limited service brokers, but there
has been little prior empirical work. This study ﬁnds that limited
service listings sell for signiﬁcantly more and spend signiﬁcantly
less time on the market than traditional listings. The price and
marketing time impacts vary by home value and local market
conditions.
Real estate brokerage commissions typically cluster at 5%, 6%, or 7% in any
particular geographic area, and few real estate brokerage ﬁrms deviate from the
standard commission. However, limited service real estate brokers are an
increasing national trend. These limited service brokers offer real estate brokerage
services on an a ´ la carte basis, in which the seller pays a ﬂat fee for services. For
example, a particular seller may wish only to have a property entered into the
area multiple listing service (MLS). Or the seller may want the limited service
broker to enter the property into the MLS and handle negotiations with the selling
agent. A variety of possible service combinations are available.1
In analyzing the potential market effects of limited service contract utilization,
this study makes four contributions to the existing literature. First, the existence
of price and time-on-market impacts due to limited service utilization is conﬁrmed.
Transaction outcomes are important to sellers pondering which type of contracting
arrangement to pursue and to agents wondering whether to offer a ´ la carte services.
Second, and arguably of more interest to academics, this work offers additional
insights into the incentives provided by conventional versus non-conventional
contracting arrangements in the real estate brokerage industry. There is a long line
of literature examining the effects of real estate brokerage contracts and/or
commission arrangements on transaction outcomes. However, only one prior study532  Benefield, Pyles, and Gleason
has considered how the use of a limited service broker affects selling price or
marketing time.
The third contribution to the existing literature is an attempt to isolate the factors
driving limited service brokerage outcomes. Speciﬁcally, the study hypothesizes
that limited service effects could be related to the price of homes offered for sale
using limited service contracts or the state of the market at the time the homes
are offered for sale. Separate analyses are conducted to test for limited service
brokerage effects controlling for these factors. The fourth contribution is
conﬁrmation that the data chosen as the ﬁnal sample have substantial bearing on
the results obtained; that is, the observations that must be discarded due to
incomplete data matter. This study includes a simple control for selection bias due
to sample inclusion that, to the authors’ knowledge, has not been utilized in prior
brokerage studies.
Using comparable sold data from a medium-sized East Coast city, a hedonic
pricing model is constructed to test for the effect of limited service broker
utilization on property sales price. In addition, hazard modeling is employed to
uncover the effect of limited service broker utilization on property time-on-market.
The MLS from which the data are drawn provides an excellent laboratory in which
to test for transaction outcomes due to limited service brokerage usage, since the
MLS requires that limited service listings be identiﬁed by the words ‘‘limited
service’’ or some close variation in the agent notes.
Somewhat surprisingly, robust results indicate that limited service listings actually
sell at a higher price and experience a shorter time-on-market for the full sample.
Differences exist in the limited service price and marketing time effects depending
on property value and market conditions.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: the next section reviews the
relevant literature, the third section discusses the data and methodology, and the
fourth section reports the empirical results. Concluding comments and directions
for future research are provided in the ﬁnal section.
 Literature Review
Hedonic pricing models and hazard models of time-on-market are well understood
and accepted methodologies in the real estate literature. Thus, this literature review
does not focus on these topics. A line of literature dating at least to the early
1970s examines the impact of real estate brokerage contract and/or commission
structures on transaction outcomes. Much of the early work dealing with real estate
brokerage contracts and commission structures is theoretical. Crockett (1982)
develops a model of proﬁt maximization within the real estate brokerage industry
and shows that current industry structure and practice lead to allocative and
technical inefﬁciencies. The main solution this author suggests to address the
problems of the real estate industry involves unbundling the services offered by
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consumers as needed. Essentially, the author suggests limited service brokerage
as a way to eliminate inefﬁciencies.
Zorn and Larsen (1986) develop a search model to compare the standard
percentage commission structure with a ﬂat-fee system of real estate broker
remuneration. They argue that the ﬂat-fee system provides inferior incentive
alignment between seller and agent in the absence of a minimum acceptable price
set by the seller. Additionally, if there is a minimum acceptable price speciﬁed,
the two systems offer equivalent incentive effects. Thus, the use of a percentage
commission structure may not be purely a result of price discrimination. Schroeter
(1987) presents an alternative model of the market for real estate brokerage in
which ‘‘value-of-service’’ pricing, or ﬁxed-percentage commission, is the optimal
payment structure. Based on this model, he argues that charges of noncompetitive
behavior by real estate brokers may be unfounded.
Arnold (1992) models the search process and investigates three possible real estate
broker payment structures: ﬁxed-percentage commission, ﬂat fee, and net listing.
Of the three, only ﬁxed-percentage commission results in the ﬁrst-best solution to
the incentive problem. Numerical analysis of the model supports the Crockett
(1982) results predicting overproduction of broker search effort, rather than the
Schroeter (1987) ‘‘value-of-service’’argument. These theoretical arguments for the
existence of ﬁxed-percentage commissions in real estate brokerage received
substantial empirical support from Goolsby and Childs (1988), whose results show
that the use of a ﬁxed-percentage commission structure does not necessarily lead
to the non-competitive pricing feared by many outside observers and predicted by
some early models.
The early literature analyzing brokerage contract and commission structure
impacts is summarized in three comprehensive literature reviews: Megbolugbe,
Marks, and Schwartz (1991), Yavas (1994), and Benjamin, Jud, and Sirmans
(2000a, 2000b). Too many works have appeared since the publication of the latest
review on this topic to allow for an in-depth discussion of each. Three of the
more common topics are buyer brokerage (e.g., Zietz and Newsome, 2002),
pricing strategies (e.g., Benjamin and Chinloy, 2000), and dual agency (e.g., Evans
and Kolbe, 2005). In addition, Munneke and Yavas (2001) consider price and
marketing time impacts of commission splits at the brokerage level. Many of the
brokerage contract and commission structure topics explored in a residential
context are beginning to be examined in a commercial brokerage setting, as seen
in Hardin, Johnson, and Wu (2009).
The work most closely related to the current study is Wiley, Zumpano, and
Beneﬁeld (2011). In that study, the authors develop a model of the seller’s choice
to utilize a limited service contract, and then empirically test the model’s
implications. They ﬁnd that sellers with more available effort to devote to selling
their own property and sellers of older homes are more likely to choose limited
service. They also ﬁnd that an increase in housing demand increases the
probability that sellers utilize limited service contracts, as increased housing534  Benefield, Pyles, and Gleason
demand will tend to increase prices and decrease marketing times in the short run.
This would, in turn, increase the total dollar cost of traditional brokerage services
and decrease the cost of seller effort to sell the home, both of which would make
limited service listings more attractive. In their empirical section, Wiley, Zumpano,
and Beneﬁeld report that limited service properties sell for more and sell faster
than traditionally marketed properties. They attribute the price ﬁnding to
mispricing in the market for full-service brokerage due to price appreciation and
the time-on-market impact, at least in part, to the sample time period.
The current study differs from Wiley, Zumpano, and Beneﬁeld (2011) in that the
market effects are investigated more thoroughly, using a clustered standard error
model, a matched sample model, and a Weibull model for marketing time. The
current study also takes the empirical investigation a step further, with the analysis
of differential impacts on high-and low-priced homes and the separate analysis of
time periods before and after the latest market peak. The current study also
introduces a control for selection bias due to failure to be included in the ﬁnal
sample. Given the number of observations with incomplete information that are
routinely discarded in studies using MLS data, some control for a potential record
completion bias seems necessary.
 Data and Methodology
Data
Variable names and deﬁnitions are provided in Exhibit 1. To conserve space, the
variable names are often used in the sections that follow. To avoid unnecessary
repetition, only variables requiring further explanation than is provided by Exhibit
1 are discussed. Also, the 13 high school attendance zones and the 12 time control
variables are not detailed in Exhibit 1, since their inclusion offers little, if any,
necessary information and they are not detailed in the results due to space
limitations.
Employing comparable sold data from Charleston, South Carolina, a medium-
sized East Coast metropolitan statistical area (MSA), this work empirically tests
the hypothesis that using a limited service real estate broker results in a lower
selling price and/or a longer time-on-market than could otherwise have been
obtained. The dataset contains information on property-speciﬁc characteristics, lot
features, geographic controls for location within the MSA, seller attributes, and
brokerage/agent attributes. The brokerage attributes include whether the listing is
identiﬁed as a limited service listing in the agent notes. This unique requirement
of the local MLS allows limited service brokerage listings to be identiﬁed with
certainty, rather than assuming any listing offering less than a ‘‘normal’’
commission split to the cooperating agent must be limited service.
Butler (1980) and Bajic (1985) suggest the selection of a reasonably homogeneous
sample as a way to avoid excessive variability in the sampled housing stock, whichSale Price, Marketing Time, and Limited Service  535
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Exhibit 1  Variable Legend
Variable Deﬁnition
SP Contract sales price of the property.
ORIGLP The original list price of the property.
DOM Days on market, from listing date to pending contract date.
SF Total heated square footage of the property.
AGE Age of the property.
BED2 One if the property has 2 bedrooms, zero otherwise.
BED3 One if the property has 3 bedrooms, zero otherwise.
BED4 One if the property has 4 bedrooms, zero otherwise.
BATH2 One if the property has 2 bathrooms, zero otherwise.
BATH3 One if the property has 3 bathrooms, zero otherwise.
HBATH One if the property has a half-bathroom, zero otherwise.
NC One if the property is newly constructed, zero otherwise.
FP One if the property has a ﬁreplace, zero otherwise.
KITCHEN ISLAND One if the property has a kitchen island, zero otherwise.
SPECIALTY CEILING One if the property has a tray, cathedral, or higher-than-average
ceiling, zero otherwise.
SUN One if the property has a sun room, zero otherwise.
STUDY One if the property has a formal study, zero otherwise.
LIVING ROOM One if the property has a formal living room, zero otherwise.
SITTING ROOM One if there is a sitting room in the master suite, zero otherwise.
WALK IN One if there is a walk-in closet in the master suite, zero otherwise.
MULTI-STORY One if the property is more than one story, zero otherwise.
BRICK One if the property has any type of brick siding, zero otherwise.
DR ST One if the best available parking is the driveway or street, zero
otherwise.
CPORT One if the best available parking is a carport, zero otherwise.
GAR1 One if the best available parking is a one-car garage, zero otherwise.
GAR2 One if the best available parking is a two-or-more-car garage, zero
otherwise.
SLAB One if the property is built on a slab, zero otherwise.
ELEV BASE One if the property is elevated or has a basement, zero otherwise.
CRAWL One if the property has a crawlspace underneath, zero otherwise.
IRRIG One if the property has an in-ground irrigation system, zero otherwise.
FENCING One if the property has a privacy fence, zero otherwise.
POOL One if the property has a pool, zero otherwise.
GOLF One if the property is located on a golf course, zero otherwise.536  Benefield, Pyles, and Gleason
Exhibit 1  (continued)
Variable Legend
Variable Deﬁnition
CUL-DE-SAC One if the property is located on a cul-de-sac, zero otherwise.
FOREST One if the property is located on a lot bordering a wooded area, zero
otherwise.
WATER One if the property is located on the water or has a water view, zero
otherwise.
DOCK One if the property has an existing dock or a dock permit in place, zero
otherwise.
Ca n dR One if the neighborhood in which the property is located has covenants
and restrictions, zero otherwise.
HOA One if the neighborhood in which the property is located has a
Homeowners’ Association, zero otherwise.
LON Longitudinal coordinate of the midpoint of the ZIP Code containing the
home.
LAT Latitudinal coordinate of the midpoint of the ZIP Code containing the
home.
AGENT-OWNED One if the property is owned by a licensed real estate agent, zero
otherwise.
VACANT One if the property is noted as being vacant, zero otherwise.
BONUS One if the seller offers a bonus of some type to the selling agent, zero
otherwise.
MOTIVATED One if there is wording to indicate a motivated seller in the Agent Notes,
zero otherwise.
REDUCED One if there was a price reduction during the marketing period, zero
otherwise.
DOP The Anglin, Rutherford and Springer (2003) degree of overpricing
measure.
ATYP The Haurin (1988) atypicality measure.
NOMKT The Johnson, Springer, and Brockman (2005) non-traditionally marketed
measure.
MONTHLY SALES The number of sales that took place in the same month as the property.
SAMPLE One if an original sample property is included in the ﬁnal sample, zero
otherwise.
IMR-SAMPLE Inverse Mills’ Ratio controlling for whether the property is included in the
ﬁnal sample.
IMR-LIM SERVICE Inverse Mills’ Ratio controlling for whether the property is a limited
service listing.
LIM SERVICE One if the property is marked as limited service, zero otherwise.Sale Price, Marketing Time, and Limited Service  537
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could lead to erroneous coefﬁcient and signiﬁcance estimations in the price and
time-on-market models. Thus, the data search includes only properties outside the
city center. In addition, the search is limited to properties with 2-to-4 bedrooms,
2 or 3 full baths, and 1,000 to 4,000 square feet of heated space. By eliminating
housing irregularities such as single bathrooms or extraordinarily large homes
during the initial search, this work seeks to avoid highly inﬂuential and high
leverage observations, allowing the hedonic price models and the time-on-market
models to more correctly assign variability.
The necessary data are readily available from the MLS. A total of 15,038
observations on sold properties were collected from September 1, 2005 through
August 31, 2007. Of the total observations, 6,210 include either a necessary ﬁeld
that is incomplete or an obviously erroneous entry. Thus, the ﬁnal sample contains
information on 8,828 properties.
While comparing MLS-reported days on market (DOM) ﬁgures to the listing
dates, pending contract dates, and closing dates reported, a potentially important
incongruity was noticed. Some real estate brokerage ﬁrms report DOM as the
number of days from listing date to pending contract date, while other ﬁrms report
the number of days from listing to closing date. To prevent estimation errors
caused by conﬂicting calculations of this variable, DOM is recalculated for each
sample property as the difference between listing date and pending contract date.
WATER is an indicator variable that incorporates information from 14 water-
related categories. It takes the value 1 if the listing describes the property, in
general, as either on the water or having a water view. Finer delineations of the
components of WATER have been used by other authors, such as Poor, Boyle,
Taylor, and Bouchard (2001). However, subjective classiﬁcations within the MLS,
combined with the number of possible classiﬁcations and the sample size, preclude
the breakdown of this variable into meaningful subcategories.
MOTIVATE is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if there is wording in
the agent notes, which are viewable only to MLS members, or in the comments,
which are viewable to Internet searchers of the MLS, that reveals a highly
motivated seller. Phrases that might signal an increased motivation level would
include variations of: motivated seller, bring all offers, seller relocated, or
foreclosure proceedings started. This is very much in the spirit of related measures
used by Dotzour and Levi (1992), Forgey, Rutherford, and VanBuskirk (1994),
and Springer (1996). VACANT takes the value 1 if the property is identiﬁed as
being vacant, which is identiﬁed as an important control in Herrin, Knight, and
Sirmans (2004), among others. REDUCED takes the value 1 if the property
experienced a price reduction at any point during the marketing period. This
measure is very similar to the measure investigated in Knight (2002).
BONUS, a variable originally identiﬁed in Johnson, Anderson, and Beneﬁeld
(2004), takes the value 1 if there is a bonus offered to the agent that presents an
acceptable contract. Bonuses may take the form of an additional cash payment at538  Benefield, Pyles, and Gleason
closing, a gift card to a local merchant, or use of a vacation property. The NOMKT
variable, which takes the value 1 if the property sold within three days of
appearing in the MLS, controls for properties that were actually sold before the
listing was entered. While this deﬁnition of NOMKT may erroneously categorize
a small number of properties that legitimately sold in only one-to-three days,
controlling for so-called ‘‘hip-pocket’’ listings is important enough in modeling
marketing time to allow a relatively small mis-categorization rate. The NOMKT
variable is very similar to the measure used in Sirmans, Turnbull, and Dombrow
(1995).
The variable of interest, LIM SERVICE, takes the value of 1 if the property is
listed as a limited service offering. As mentioned earlier, the MLS providing the
data requires that limited service listings be identiﬁed as such by the words
‘‘limited service’’ or a close variant in the agent notes, avoiding a scenario in
which limited service brokers are identiﬁed as all brokers offering less than the
prevailing commission split for the area. Summary statistics for the full sample
are provided in Panel A of Exhibit 2.
Methodology
Before estimating any price or time-on-market models, possible selection bias in
the data must be addressed. There are two potential sources of selection bias: bias
due to failure to be included in the ﬁnal sample and bias related to a property
being marketed as a limited service offering. An Inverse Mills’ Ratio (IMR) is
computed for each possible source of selection bias. Thus, IMR-SAMPLE controls
for SOLD properties that did not enter the ﬁnal sample, and IMR-LIM SERVICE
controls for possible selection bias associated with those properties that are
marketed as limited service listings.
The ﬁrst step in computing the IMR is estimating the probability of the outcome
in question. For example, the estimate of the probability that the ith SOLD property
will be included in the ﬁnal sample is obtained using the following binary logistic
regression model:
NN
exp    X   Z   0 ii jj
i1 j1
P(SAMPLE)  . (1) i NN
1  exp    X   Z   0 ii jj
i1 j1
Similarly, the estimate of the probability that the ith SOLD property is a limited


































































Exhibit 2  Summary Statistics





Contracts  Median  Median Through Peak After Peak
SP 237,155 (87,785) 236,724 (87,682) 273,233 (89,233) 168,394 (26,897) 304,065 (73,640) 237,632 (88,815) 237,364 (86,544)
ORIGLP 245,472 (94,137) 245,055 (94,097) 280,364 (91,332) 173,131 (29,775) 315,865 (81,085) 245,411 (95,518) 247,539 (93,349)
DOM 60.0 (63.6) 60.2 (63.8) 43.8 (46.7) 54.7 (58.1) 65.2 (68.2) 60.6 (66.8) 63.6 (63.5)
SF 1,869.8 (486.6) 1,868.5 (486.1) 1,978.4 (515.8) 1,592.8 (318.9) 2,139.3 (469.9) 1,880.2 (487.2) 1,852.4 (482.8)
AGE 14.259 (13.807) 14.266 (13.840) 13.612 (10.698) 15.415 (13.709) 13.133 (13.811) 14.102 (13.614) 14.644 (14.148)
BED2 0.014 (0.117) 0.014 (0.118) 0.009 (0.093) 0.020 (0.139) 0.008 (0.091) 0.014 (0.116) 0.014 (0.117)
BED3 0.644 (0.479) 0.645 (0.479) 0.629 (0.485) 0.763 (0.425) 0.529 (0.499) 0.642 (0.480) 0.650 (0.477)
BED4 0.342 (0.474) 0.341 (0.474) 0.362 (0.483) 0.218 (0.413) 0.462 (0.499) 0.345 (0.475) 0.336 (0.472)
BATH2 0.907 (0.290) 0.907 (0.290) 0.905 (0.294) 0.969 (0.173) 0.847 (0.360) 0.906 (0.292) 0.909 (0.288)
BATH3 0.093 (0.290) 0.093 (0.290) 0.095 (0.294) 0.031 (0.173) 0.153 (0.360) 0.094 (0.292) 0.091 (0.288)
HBATH 0.429 (0.495) 0.428 (0.495) 0.526 (0.502) 0.285 (0.451) 0.570 (0.495) 0.443 (0.497) 0.411 (0.492)
NC 0.239 (0.426) 0.241 (0.428) 0.035 (0.183) 0.227 (0.419) 0.249 (0.433) 0.258 (0.438) 0.201 (0.401)
FP 0.780 (0.414) 0.779 (0.415) 0.836 (0.372) 0.659 (0.474) 0.898 (0.303) 0.781 (0.413) 0.780 (0.414)
KITCHEN ISLAND 0.102 (0.303) 0.102 (0.303) 0.092 (0.290) 0.050 (0.219) 0.150 (0.357) 0.099 (0.299) 0.108 (0.311)
SPECIALTY CEILING 0.739 (0.439) 0.738 (0.440) 0.807 (0.396) 0.676 (0.468) 0.798 (0.402) 0.732 (0.443) 0.748 (0.434)
SUN 0.080 (0.271) 0.080 (0.272) 0.069 (0.255) 0.052 (0.223) 0.107 (0.309) 0.080 (0.271) 0.079 (0.269)
STUDY 0.081 (0.273) 0.080 (0.272) 0.138 (0.346) 0.040 (0.195) 0.121 (0.326) 0.080 (0.272) 0.081 (0.273)
LIVING ROOM 0.267 (0.442) 0.266 (0.442) 0.319 (0.468) 0.184 (0.388) 0.347 (0.476) 0.271 (0.445) 0.257 (0.437)
SITTING ROOM 0.030 (0.170) 0.029 (0.169) 0.069 (0.255) 0.014 (0.118) 0.045 (0.207) 0.029 (0.167) 0.031 (0.174)
WALK IN 0.630 (0.483) 0.630 (0.483) 0.664 (0.475) 0.567 (0.496) 0.691 (0.462) 0.628 (0.483) 0.633 (0.482)






























Exhibit 2  (continued)
Summary Statistics
Variable Full Sample Full Service Contracts Limited Service Contracts  Median  Median Through Peak After Peak
BRICK 0.317 (0.465) 0.317 (0.465) 0.293 (0.457) 0.311 (0.463) 0.322 (0.467) 0.312 (0.463) 0.332 (0.471)
DR ST 0.071 (0.257) 0.071 (0.257) 0.069 (0.255) 0.096 (0.294) 0.048 (0.213) 0.071 (0.256) 0.074 (0.261)
CPORT 0.019 (0.137) 0.019 (0.137) 0.017 (0.131) 0.021 (0.145) 0.017 (0.128) 0.020 (0.139) 0.017 (0.130)
GAR1 0.220 (0.414) 0.221 (0.415) 0.138 (0.346) 0.334 (0.472) 0.109 (0.312) 0.217 (0.412) 0.225 (0.418)
GAR2 0.689 (0.463) 0.688 (0.463) 0.776 (0.419) 0.548 (0.498) 0.826 (0.379) 0.692 (0.462) 0.684 (0.465)
SLAB 0.643 (0.479) 0.643 (0.479) 0.603 (0.491) 0.752 (0.432) 0.536 (0.499) 0.642 (0.479) 0.641 (0.480)
ELEV BASE 0.011 (0.106) 0.011 (0.105) 0.017 (0.131) 0.002 (0.041) 0.021 (0.142) 0.011 (0.104) 0.012 (0.110)
CRAWL 0.346 (0.476) 0.346 (0.476) 0.379 (0.487) 0.246 (0.431) 0.444 (0.497) 0.347 (0.476) 0.347 (0.476)
IRRIG 0.113 (0.317) 0.114 (0.317) 0.095 (0.294) 0.050 (0.218) 0.175 (0.380) 0.115 (0.319) 0.111 (0.314)
FENCING 0.499 (0.500) 0.497 (0.500) 0.603 (0.491) 0.569 (0.495) 0.431 (0.495) 0.481 (0.500) 0.535 (0.499)
POOL 0.043 (0.203) 0.043 (0.203) 0.035 (0.183) 0.046 (0.210) 0.040 (0.195) 0.043 (0.202) 0.046 (0.209)
GOLF 0.019 (0.136) 0.019 (0.136) 0.017 (0.131) 0.005 (0.073) 0.032 (0.176) 0.022 (0.146) 0.013 (0.113)
CUL-DE-SAC 0.191 (0.393) 0.190 (0.392) 0.293 (0.457) 0.177 (0.382) 0.205 (0.403) 0.186 (0.389) 0.199 (0.399)
FOREST 0.212 (0.409) 0.213 (0.409) 0.172 (0.379) 0.167 (0.373) 0.256 (0.437) 0.207 (0.405) 0.227 (0.419)
WATER 0.152 (0.359) 0.151 (0.358) 0.198 (0.400) 0.074 (0.261) 0.228 (0.420) 0.156 (0.363) 0.151 (0.358)
DOCK 0.009 (0.093) 0.009 (0.093) 0.009 (0.093) 0.001 (0.038) 0.016 (0.125) 0.008 (0.091) 0.010 (0.099)
Ca n dR 0.760 (0.427) 0.759 (0.428) 0.814 (0.391) 0.674 (0.469) 0.843 (0.363) 0.767 (0.423) 0.744 (0.436)
HOA 0.719 (0.449) 0.719 (0.450) 0.776 (0.419) 0.622 (0.485) 0.814 (0.389) 0.727 (0.446) 0.708 (0.455)
LON 80.076 (0.134) 80.076 (0.134) 80.022 (0.134) 80.119 (0.102) 80.034 (0.147) 80.076 (0.134) 80.075 (0.133)
LAT 32.912 (0.104) 32.912 (0.104) 32.882 (0.101) 32.961 (0.081) 32.864 (0.101) 32.912 (0.103) 32.912 (0.104)


































































Exhibit 2  (continued)
Summary Statistics
Variable Full Sample Full Service Contracts Limited Service Contracts  Median  Median Through Peak After Peak
VACANT 0.069 (0.253) 0.069 (0.254) 0.026 (0.159) 0.066 (0.248) 0.072 (0.258) 0.067 (0.250) 0.074 (0.262)
BONUS 0.045 (0.207) 0.045 (0.207) 0.043 (0.204) 0.044 (0.205) 0.046 (0.209) 0.038 (0.191) 0.060 (0.237)
MOTIVATED 0.134 (0.340) 0.134 (0.341) 0.086 (0.282) 0.132 (0.338) 0.135 (0.342) 0.124 (0.330) 0.157 (0.364)
REDUCED 0.324 (0.468) 0.325 (0.468) 0.259 (0.440) 0.290 (0.454) 0.357 (0.479) 0.308 (0.462) 0.378 (0.485)
DOP 0.468 (0.203) 0.469 (0.203) 0.399 (0.209) 0.574 (0.153) 0.364 (0.192) 0.470 (0.201) 0.459 (0.205)
ATYP 0.016 (0.161) 0.016 (0.162) 0.049 (0.119) 0.030 (0.118) 0.061 (0.183) 0.018 (0.165) 0.013 (0.158)
NOMKT 0.106 (0.308) 0.106 (0.308) 0.112 (0.317) 0.104 (0.305) 0.109 (0.311) 0.107 (0.310) 0.100 (0.299)
MONTHLY SALES 568.42 (569.00) 568.2 (129.9) 587.2 (114.2) 568.26 (575.00) 568.58 (569.00) 603.70 (622.00) 512.70 (520.00)
IMR-SAMPLE 0.335 (0.079) 0.336 (0.079) 0.302 (0.026) 0.344 (0.087) 0.327 (0.068) 0.339 (0.081) 0.331 (0.076)
IMR-LIM SERVICE 0.791 (0.008) 0.791 (0.008) 0.783 (0.013) 0.793 (0.004) 0.788 (0.009) 0.791 (0.007) 0.790 (0.008)
LIM SERVICE 0.012 (0.108) 0.000 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000) 0.007 (0.086) 0.016 (0.126) 0.013 (0.115) 0.010 (0.100)
Panel B: Matched Sample
Limited Service Properties Matched Sample Properties
Mean Std. Dev. Max Min Mean Std. Dev. Max Min
SP 273,233 89,233 495,000 135,000 248,209 85,607 496,000 70,000
DOM 43.8 46.7 198 1 67.3 57.7 287 1
SF 1,978.4 515.8 3,592 1,100 1,973.8 474.9 3,130 1,108
AGE 13.612 10.698 63 1 11.595 10.406 48 1
Difference in Sale Date 14.88 9.70 37 0
Note: The matched sample is formed based on high school attendance zone, date of sale, property age, square footage, number of bedrooms and bathrooms, and presence of a half-bath. Local real estate
professionals report that these are the parameters most often used in initial screening of properties.542  Benefield, Pyles, and Gleason
NN
exp    X   Z   0 ii jj
i1 j1
P(LIM SERVICE )  , (2) i NN
1  exp    X   Z   0 ii jj
i1 j1
where Xi is a matrix of property-speciﬁc characteristics, including structural
features, quality signals, lot attributes, and location controls. Zj is a matrix used
to control for other characteristics found to inﬂuence the probability that a
particular SOLD property is included in the ﬁnal sample or is a limited service
property, respectively, for Equations (1) and (2). Components of the X- and Z-
matrices differ for Equations (1) and (2); Exhibit 3 provides the list of variables
for each regression. Once the event probabilities have been estimated and
recorded, the IMR is a relatively simple calculation. Setting ui equal to the
probability from Equation (1) of a particular SOLD property being included in the
ﬁnal sample, then:
2 1 0.5ui e
2 IMR  SAMPLE  . (3) i ui 1 2 0.5ui  ed u i
 2
IMR-LIM SERVICE is computed in a similar manner.
Hedonic pricing models have been ubiquitous in the real estate literature for many
years, and hazard modeling of time-on-market has more recently become the
standard property duration methodology. A brief examination of recent works
utilizing hedonic modeling reveals that the most common and appropriate general
speciﬁcation for property price estimation is:
NN
ln(SP)     X   Z   LnDOM  0 ii jj k k
i1 j1
  LIM SERVICE  , (4) l
where Xi is again a matrix of property-speciﬁc characteristics. Zj is a matrix used
to control for other determinants of price identiﬁed in prior works, such as the
Rutherford, Springer, and Yavas (2005) premium for agents selling properties that
they own. Exhibits 4–7 detail the complete contents of the X- and Z-matrices usedSale Price, Marketing Time, and Limited Service  543
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Exhibit 3  Binary Logistic Regressions to Compute Inverse Mills’ Ratios
Dependent Variable is SAMPLE Dependent Variable is LIM SERVICE
Constant 11.149*** Constant 222.860***
LnORIGLP 1.153*** LnSF 0.732*
BED2 0.650** LnAGE 0.284**
BED4 0.337*** NC 3.129***
NC 2.374*** STUDY 0.590**
KITCHEN ISLAND 0.229** SITTING ROOM 0.712*
SPECIALTY CEILING 0.167** CUL-DE-SAC 0.492**
SUN 0.668*** FOREST 0.411*
STUDY 0.389*** LON 2.272***
LIVING ROOM 0.230*** LAT 1.537
SITTING ROOM 0.821*** AGENT-OWNED 2.098**
WALK IN 0.297*** VACANT 1.203**
BRICK 0.416*** MOTIVATED 0.709**
















Note: LnORIGLP, LnSF,a n dLnAGE represent the natural logs of the variables ORIGLP, SF,a n d
AGE, respectively. Those three variables are deﬁned in Exhibit 1, as are the remainder of the
variables reported in the models. The model for whether an observation is included in the ﬁnal
sample contains time controls, but these are not reported due to space considerations. For
SAMPLE, N  10,919 and the log-likelihood is 3,199.6. For LIM SERVICE, N  13,157 and
log-likelihood is 636.4. The signs are all positive and highly signiﬁcant, with the exception of the
fall of 2006, just after the market peak, which is insigniﬁcant.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.544  Benefield, Pyles, and Gleason
Exhibit 4  Standard Price and Time-on-Market Models





Hedonic 2SLS Weibull 2SLS
Constant 9.492*** 9.492*** Constant 5.249*** 19.307***
LnDOM 0.000 0.000 LnSP 0.552*** 2.394***
LnSF 0.670*** 0.661*** LnSF 0.506*** 2.236***
LnAGE 0.048*** 0.048*** LnAGE 0.050*** 0.215***
BED2 0.084*** 0.084*** BED2 0.117* 0.314***
BED4 0.023*** 0.023*** BED4 0.022 0.030
BATH3 0.070*** 0.070*** MULTI-STORY 0.014 0.024
HBATH 0.027*** 0.027*** NC 0.038 0.005
FP 0.026*** 0.026*** ELEV BASE 0.189*** 0.588***
NC 0.056*** 0.056*** CRAWL 0.054*** 0.236***
MULTI-STORY 0.018** 0.018*** CUL-DE-SAC 0.042** 0.101***
BRICK 0.019*** 0.019*** MOTIVATED 0.078*** 0.238***
ELEV BASE 0.128*** 0.128*** VACANT 0.071** 0.307***
CRAWL 0.070*** 0.073*** BONUS 0.080** 0.213***
CPORT 0.073*** 0.084*** NOMKT 2.517*** 3.561***
GAR1 0.065*** 0.065*** ATYP 0.537*** 2.591***
GAR2 0.095*** 0.095*** DOP 0.041 0.002***
IRRIG 0.096*** 0.096*** MONTHLY SALES 0.000*** 0.001***
POOL 0.016** 0.016** IMR-SAMPLE 0.508*** 0.298
GOLF 0.107*** 0.107*** IMR-LIM SERVICE 0.457 1.373




MONTHLY SALES 0.000*** 0.000***
IMR-SAMPLE 0.334*** 0.334***
IMR-LIM SERVICE 2.348*** 2.348***
LIM SERVICE 0.038*** 0.038***
F 919.2*** 919.2*** F 347.2***
R2 84.0% 84.0% R2 55.8%
Adj. R2 83.9% 83.9% Adj. R2 55.7%Sale Price, Marketing Time, and Limited Service  545
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Exhibit 4  (continued)
Standard Price and Time-on-Market Models
Note: LnSP, LnDOM, LnSF,a n dLnAGE represent the natural logs of the variables SP, DOM, SF,
and AGE, respectively. Those four variables are deﬁned in Exhibit 1, as are the remainder of the
variables reported in the models. Time and location controls are included in the pricing models,
but are not reported due to space considerations; these control variables all behave as expected.
Location controls are included in the time-on-market model, but not reported due to space
considerations. Location controls are all negative and signiﬁcant in the 2SLS model of marketing
time, except for School Zone 1, which is insigniﬁcant. Location controls do not behave as
consistently in the Weibull model, which is not unexpected given the nature of hazard models. The
ﬁrst-stage estimate of price, which is used in the second-stage estimate of time-on-market, contains
the same predictors detailed in the hedonic model above, except LnDOM. The reverse is true of
the ﬁrst-stage estimate of marketing time. Variable of interest is LIM SERVICE. N  8,828. For the
TOM hazard model, the log-likelihood is 16,830.2 and  is 1.544.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
to estimate Equation (4). DOM is used in Equation (4) to control for variation
in sales price related to marketing time. Finally, the variable of interest,
LIM SERVICE, controls for properties marketed via limited service contracts.
Regarding the time-on-market model, the Weibull hazard model is favored over
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, since the increased adaptability and
ﬂexibility of the Weibull has fairly thoroughly displaced OLS estimation of
marketing time. This function takes the form:
1 (t, X)  t , (5)
where  represents the shape parameter;  represents the operational speciﬁcation
of the model; and t represents a time variable. If the shape, or duration
dependence, parameter is greater than one, then the model exhibits positive
duration dependence. In this case, the probability that a property sells is increasing
across time. In contrast, if the duration dependence parameter is less than one,
then the model exhibits negative duration dependence, and the probability that a
property sells is decreasing over time. In the special case where the duration
dependence parameter equals one, then the Weibull hazard function conveniently
reduces to the exponential hazard function, and the probability that a property
sells is constant through time.
A quick review of recent studies modeling time-on-market reveals the following






























Exhibit 5  Firm-Clustered Standard Error and Matched Sample Price and Time-on-Market Models
Pricing Models TOM Hazard Models
Dependent Variable is LnSP Dependent Variable is LnDOM
Cluster Matched Cluster Matched
Constant 9.777*** 5.327*** Constant 5.252*** 2.810
LnDOM 0.000 0.017* LnSP 0.552*** 0.266
LnSF 0.658*** 0.944*** LnSF 0.506*** 0.322
LnAGE 0.048*** 0.021 LnAGE 0.050*** 0.043
BED2 0.070*** 0.532*** BED2 0.117 0.220
BED4 0.023*** 0.046* BED4 0.022 0.202*
BATH3 0.073*** 0.086* MULTI-STORY 0.014 0.051
HBATH 0.030*** 0.038 NC 0.038 0.324
FP 0.025*** 0.032 ELEV BASE 0.189*** 0.852*
NC 0.063*** 0.223*** CRAWL 0.054*** 0.237**
MULTI-STORY 0.023*** 0.101*** CUL-DE-SAC 0.042*** 0.180*
BRICK 0.016** 0.041 MOTIVATED 0.078*** 0.031
ELEV BASE 0.124*** 0.107 VACANT 0.071*** 0.079
CRAWL 0.077*** 0.002 BONUS 0.080*** 0.062
CPORT 0.082*** 0.075 NOMKT 2.517*** 3.691***
GAR1 0.068*** 0.229*** ATYP 0.537*** 0.402


































































Exhibit 5  (continued)
Firm-Clustered Standard Error and Matched Sample Price and Time-on-Market Models
Pricing Models TOM Hazard Models
Dependent Variable is LnSP Dependent Variable is LnDOM
Cluster Matched Cluster Matched
IRRIG 0.094*** 0.011 MONTHLY SALES 0.000 0.000
POOL 0.016 0.040 IMR-SAMPLE 0.509*** 6.409**
GOLF 0.107*** 0.150** IMR-LIM SERVICE 0.456 N/A




MONTHLY SALES 0.000*** 0.000
IMR-SAMPLE 0.369*** 0.484
IMR-LIM SERVICE 2.568*** N/A
LIM SERVICE 0.038*** 0.126***
F 969.3 26.4***  1.544 1.730
R2 84.0% 87.3% Wald 	2 2,488.3
Adj. R2 84.0% Log-pseudolikelihood 11,653.4
Log-likelihood 379.5






























Exhibit 5  (continued)
Firm-Clustered Standard Error and Matched Sample Price and Time-on-Market Models
Note: LnSP, LnDOM, LnSF,a n dLnAGE represent the natural logs of the variables SP, DOM, SF,a n dAGE, respectively. Those four variables are deﬁned in
Exhibit 1, as are the remainder of the variables reported in the models. Again, the matched sample is formed based on high school attendance zone, date
of sale, property age, square footage, number of bedrooms and bathrooms, and presence of a half-bath. Time and location controls are included in the
pricing models, but are not reported due to space considerations. Both sets of controls behave as expected in the ﬁrm-clustered standard errors model.
Location controls are negative and highly signiﬁcant for all available school zones except School Zone 6 in the matched sample pricing model, while time
controls are generally insigniﬁcant in the matching price model, as expected. Location controls are included in the time-on-market models, but not reported
due to space considerations. They are all negative and signiﬁcant in the ﬁrm-clustered standard errors model of time-on-market, except for School Zones 1
and 8, which are insigniﬁcant. Location controls are generally insigniﬁcant in the matched sample marketing time model, which is to be expected. Variable
of interest is LIM SERVICE.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.


































































Exhibit 6  Price and Time-on-Market Models for Above- and Below-Median Limited Service Sale Price
Pricing Models TOM Hazard Models
Dependent Variable is LnSP Dependent Variable is LnDOM
 Median  Median  Median  Median
Constant 11.940*** 10.681*** Constant 6.148** 6.766***
LnDOM 0.002** 0.006*** LnSP 0.465*** 0.836***
LnSF 0.530*** 0.451*** LnSF 0.362*** 0.644***
LnAGE 0.042*** 0.014*** LnAGE 0.047*** 0.054***
BED2 0.043** 0.109*** BED2 0.153** 0.054
BED4 0.011** 0.007 BED4 0.014 0.035
BATH3 0.035*** 0.048*** MULTI-STORY 0.022 0.004
HBATH 0.017*** 0.015** NC 0.006 0.070
FP 0.015*** 0.026** ELEV BASE 0.061 0.185***
NC 0.052*** 0.066*** CRAWL 0.066** 0.060**
MULTI-STORY 0.008 0.011 CUL-DE-SAC 0.065** 0.005
BRICK 0.012*** 0.012** MOTIVATED 0.107*** 0.021
ELEV BASE 0.059* 0.183*** VACANT 0.087** 0.046
CRAWL 0.013*** 0.101*** BONUS 0.067 0.090*
CPORT 0.058*** 0.062*** NOMKT 2.553*** 2.455***
GAR1 0.093*** 0.036*** ATYP 0.561*** 0.666***






























Exhibit 6  (continued)
Price and Time-on-Market Models for Above- and Below-Median Limited Service Sale Price
Pricing Models TOM Hazard Models
Dependent Variable is LnSP Dependent Variable is LnDOM
 Median  Median  Median  Median
IRRIG 0.057*** 0.075*** MONTHLY SALES 0.000* 0.000**
POOL 0.001 0.007 IMR-SAMPLE 0.661*** 0.371
GOLF 0.063*** 0.048*** IMR-LIM SERVICE 1.739 1.001




MONTHLY SALES 0.000*** 0.000
IMR-SAMPLE 0.170*** 0.392***
IMR-LIM SERVICE 4.284*** 1.622***
LIM SERVICE 0.031** 0.018
F 317.2*** 79.3***
R2 73.7% 56.4%  1.473 1.708
Adj. R2 73.5% 55.7% Log-likelihood 10,760.0 6,027.8


































































Exhibit 6  (continued)
Price and Time-on-Market Models for Above- and Below-Median Limited Service Sale Price
Note: LnSP, LnDOM, LnSF,a n dLnAGE represent the natural logs of the variables SP, DOM, SF,a n dAGE, respectively. Those four variables are deﬁned in
Exhibit 1, as are the remainder of the variables reported in the models. Time and location controls are included in the pricing models, but are not reported
due to space considerations. Location controls are all negative and highly signiﬁcant in the pricing models, except School Zone 6 in the below-median price
subsample and School Zone 9 in the above-median price subsample. Time controls in the pricing models are negative and signiﬁcant through the winter of
2005, and insigniﬁcant thereafter in the below-median price subsample; exceptions are positive, signiﬁcant coefﬁcients for the fall of 2006 and the spring of
2007. Time controls in pricing models for the above-median price subsample are negative and signiﬁcant in the summer and fall of 2005, the winter of
2006, and the spring of 2007, and are insigniﬁcant otherwise. Location controls are included in the time-on-market model, but not reported due to space
considerations. Half of the location controls are negative and signiﬁcant in each subsample; the other half are insigniﬁcant. This is not surprising, given the
reduced sample sizes and small number of observations in some school zones. Variable of interest is LIM SERVICE.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.






























Exhibit 7  Price and Time-on-Market Models for Properties Sold Before and After Market Peak
Pricing Models TOM Hazard Models
Dependent Variable is LnSP Dependent Variable is LnDOM
Through Peak After Peak Through Peak After Peak
Constant 9.492*** 9.677*** Constant 5.804*** 6.386***
LnDOM 0.002 0.003* LnSP 0.590*** 0.644***
LnSF 0.683*** 0.637*** LnSF 0.537*** 0.571***
LnAGE 0.057*** 0.046*** LnAGE 0.051*** 0.047***
BED2 0.086*** 0.118*** BED2 0.156** 0.080
BED4 0.026*** 0.020*** BED4 0.021 0.020
BATH3 0.072*** 0.064*** MULTI-STORY 0.008 0.028
HBATH 0.025*** 0.029*** NC 0.034 0.046
FP 0.031*** 0.024*** ELEV BASE 0.279*** 0.140*
NC 0.053*** 0.048*** CRAWL 0.033 0.081***
MULTI-STORY 0.016** 0.018** CUL-DE-SAC 0.064*** 0.012
BRICK 0.017*** 0.020*** MOTIVATED 0.059** 0.062**
ELEV BASE 0.131*** 0.111*** VACANT 0.057 0.058
CRAWL 0.076*** 0.075*** BONUS 0.091** 0.053
CPORT 0.084*** 0.085*** NOMKT 2.828*** 2.186***
GAR1 0.061*** 0.060*** ATYP 0.571*** 0.582***


































































Exhibit 7  (continued)
Price and Time-on-Market Models for Properties Sold Before and After Market Peak
Pricing Models TOM Hazard Models
Dependent Variable is LnSP Dependent Variable is LnDOM
Through Peak After Peak Through Peak After Peak
IRRIG 0.099*** 0.099*** MONTHLY SALES 0.000 0.001***
POOL 0.012 0.019* IMR-SAMPLE 0.894*** 0.350
GOLF 0.094*** 0.149*** IMR-LIM SERVICE 0.789 0.767




MONTHLY SALES 0.000*** 0.000***
IMR-SAMPLE 0.312*** 0.335***
IMR-LIM SERVICE 2.457*** 2.295***
LIM SERVICE 0.033** 0.063***
F 690.8*** 474.9***
R2 84.1% 83.8%  1.469 1.769
Adj. R2 84.0% 83.7% Log-likelihood 11,366.0 7,659.3






























Exhibit 7  (continued)
Price and Time-on-Market Models for Properties Sold Before and After Market Peak
Note: LnSP, LnDOM, LnSF,a n dLnAGE represent the natural logs of the variables SP, DOM, SF,a n dAGE, respectively. Those four variables are deﬁned in
Exhibit 1, as are the remainder of the variables reported in the models. Time and location controls are included in the pricing models, but are not reported
due to space considerations. Both sets of controls behave as expected in the pricing models using the before- and after-market peak subsamples. Location
controls are included in the time-on-market models, but are not reported due to space considerations. Location controls in the marketing time models are
negative and signiﬁcant in the before-market peak subsample for all school zones except School Zone 1, which is insigniﬁcant. Location controls in the
marketing time models are negative and signiﬁcant in the after-market peak subsample for all school zones except School Zones 1, 6, and 8, which are
insigniﬁcant. Variable of interest is LIM SERVICE.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.Sale Price, Marketing Time, and Limited Service  555
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NN
exp(X)     X   Z   LnSP  0 ii jj k k
i1 j1
  LIM SERVICE  , (6) l
where Xi and Zj are as deﬁned above, although neither contains exactly the same
data as in Equation (4). For example, Zj in Equation (6) includes variables to
control for, among other things, the atypical property effect (ATYP) highlighted
by Haurin (1988) and the degree of overpricing effect (DOP) from Anglin,
Rutherford, and Springer (2003).2 SP is used in Equation (6) to control for
variation in time-on-market related to selling price. As before, LIM SERVICE
controls for properties marketed using limited service contracts. Exhibits 4–7
provide further details on the components of the X- and Z-matrices used in
Equation (6).
The two-stage least squares (2SLS) treatment of these variables is slightly different
as it requires speciﬁcation of a model for the endogenously determined variable
in the ﬁrst stage. In the 2SLS model for property price, where DOM is assumed
endogenous, the instruments chosen in the ﬁrst stage include all the variables
utilized in the hazard model above, except SP. Similarly, for the 2SLS model of
property marketing time, in which SP is assumed to be endogenous, the ﬁrst-stage
instruments include the variables for the standard hedonic model described above,
except DOM. For the second stages of the 2SLS price and time-on-market models,
the operational models described in Equations (4) and (6) are speciﬁed.
 Results
Inverse Mills’ Ratio
The Inverse Mills’ Ratio (IMR) results control for systematic differences in
the chosen variable that may be due to unobserved variables. In the case of
IMR-SAMPLE, the IMR controls for systematic differences in completion of MLS
records, since the only reason a successfully-screened SOLD property would be
excluded from the ﬁnal sample is missing or obviously erroneous information.
Exhibits 4–7 provide some indication of a systematic component in determining
which properties are more likely to have missing data, as IMR-SAMPLE is
signiﬁcant at the 1% level in every pricing model except the matched sample.
IMR-SAMPLE is also signiﬁcant at the 5% level or better in seven of the ten time-
on-market models.
Surveying Exhibit 3, it seems that properties with higher original listing prices
are more likely to have complete information provided, while newly constructed
properties or ‘‘hip-pocket’’ listings are less likely to have full information.556  Benefield, Pyles, and Gleason
Interestingly, variables one might associate with increased seller motivation,
such as VACANT, MOTIVATED,o rREDUCED, also signiﬁcantly increase the
probability of an observation having complete information provided. Agents also
seem more likely to provide complete information when selling properties they
own, as seen from the positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on AGENT-OWNED.
For IMR-LIM SERVICE, the IMR controls for systematic differences between
properties marketed as limited service listings and conventionally-marketed
properties. Given the lack of seller-speciﬁc information in the MLS, it is not
surprising that this control is signiﬁcant at the 1% level in every subsequent pricing
model. The unobserved attributes contributing to the differences in pricing do
not seem to affect determination of time-on-market to the same degree, as
IMR-LIM SERVICE is insigniﬁcant in each marketing time model. Obviously,
there is no need to include IMR-LIM SERVICE in the matched sample models.
Larger and newer properties, as well as properties with quality characteristics such
as a formal study, a sitting room in the master bedroom, or a cul-de-sac lot, seem
more likely to be listed as limited service offerings. Perhaps not surprisingly,
AGENT-OWNED properties and properties with sellers that signal a high
motivation level (i.e., MOTIVATED and VACANT) are less likely to utilize limited
service listings. MONTHLY SALES, a measure of how many sales happen in the
same month as a particular sample property, proxies for how ‘‘hot’’ the market is
at a current time. As can be seen, market sales levels do not inﬂuence the
likelihood that a seller chooses a limited service listing. This control for the current
state of the market is included in all price and marketing time models as well.
Standard Price and Time-on-Market Models
The results in Exhibit 4 for the hedonic pricing model and the 2SLS model of
property price are as expected. Most control variables exhibit the expected
relationship to the dependent variable. The signiﬁcantly positive coefﬁcient for
two-bedroom homes and the signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcient for four-bedroom
homes are surprising, since this price effect is measured relative to three-bedroom
homes. LIM SERVICE, the variable of interest, enters both models as positive
and signiﬁcant at the 1% level, which is the opposite of expectations. Limited
service properties sell for 3.8% more on average according to both the hedonic
pricing model and the 2SLS model of property price.
Turning to the standard time-on-market models in Exhibit 4, most variables again
behave as expected across the Weibull hazard model and the 2SLS model of
property marketing time. The variables included that might signal greater seller
motivation, MOTIVATED, VACANT, and BONUS, enter as positive and signiﬁcant,
implying that these sellers actually take longer to sell their homes. However, this
is not a unique ﬁnding, as other studies using similar variables have found
signiﬁcantly positive or insigniﬁcant results as well (e.g., Knight, 2002; Johnson,
Anderson, and Beneﬁeld, 2004). The variable of interest, LIM SERVICE,i sSale Price, Marketing Time, and Limited Service  557
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negative and signiﬁcant at the 10% level in the Weibull model and at the 5% level
in the 2SLS model. For the Weibull model, limited service properties are estimated
to sell 13.2% faster than properties using conventional brokerage services. The
estimated reduction in selling time for limited service properties in the 2SLS
model is even larger, at 20.0%.
Robustness Tests
Firm-Clustered Standard Error Model. Despite controlling for potential bias due
to sample selection or limited service usage in all four traditional price and time-
on-market models, the counterintuitive results identiﬁed in all four models could
be driven by a relatively small number of observations from one or a few ﬁrms.
To help eliminate this possibility, the model was re-estimated allowing the
standard errors to cluster by ﬁrm. Overall, the ﬁrm-clustered standard error results
are very similar to earlier results, including the two-bedroom versus four-bedroom
oddity in the pricing model and the signiﬁcantly positive coefﬁcients for seller
motivation-related variables in the time-on-market model. Despite allowing for
clustered standard errors, the same result is observed and reported in Exhibit 5.
LIM SERVICE is found to signiﬁcantly increase selling price by an estimated
3.8% on average and reduce selling time by 13.2% on average.
Matched Sample Model. As a more direct test of pricing and time-on-market
impacts due to limited service contracting arrangements, a matched sample of
conventionally-marketed properties is formed. The matching is accomplished
using high school attendance zone, date of sale, property age, total square footage,
bedroom and bathroom counts, and presence of a half-bathroom. These criteria
are developed based on conversations with area real estate salespeople, who
indicated that these were the base statistics most home buyers used to deﬁne initial
search parameters.
The high school attendance zones match exactly in all cases, as this was deemed
the most important single criterion. Date of sale is kept within one month,
although four cases have dates of sale that differ by one-to-six days more than
one month (i.e., 32-to-37 days total). Square footage is kept within 100 square
feet if possible, although a number of properties require concessions on this
criterion. Age is kept to within ﬁve years when possible, but a number of
properties again necessitate wider limits on this variable. Only 10 properties out
of 116 differ along the bedroom or bathroom count dimensions. While a very few
of the limited service properties are harder to match than others, the summary
statistics for limited service and matching properties in Panel B of Exhibit 2
indicate that the matching is quite close overall.
Exhibit 5 shows that fewer control variables enter the models as signiﬁcant
predictors of either price or time-on-market using standard hedonic and hazard
modeling, respectively. This is to be expected, given the use of a matched sample.
After matching, the remaining signiﬁcant predictors of price maintain consistent558  Benefield, Pyles, and Gleason
signs, including the bedroom pricing anomaly. Of note, the pricing impact
assigned to limited service usage is still signiﬁcant at the 1% level and has a
substantially larger coefﬁcient of 12.6%. Also of note, LIM SERVICE still reduces
a property’s marketing time by an estimated 21.9%, which is also signiﬁcant at
the 1% level.
Recall from the summary statistics presented in Exhibit 2 that only slightly more
than 1% of the sample properties employ limited service listings. If the ﬁndings
presented in the standard price and time-on-market models and the robustness
check models are correct, namely that limited service properties sell for more and
sell more quickly, then why do more sellers not choose limited service brokerage?
There are at least two possible explanations. First, during the sample period, there
were a relatively small number of ﬁrms in the area willing to offer limited service
listings. Second, if the argument presented below regarding sellers’conﬁdence and
the choice of limited service listings is correct, then primarily those sellers who
are most conﬁdent of their ability to sell their property would use limited service
listing. This number could reasonably be expected to be relatively small.
Differential Impacts in Low- and High-Priced
Subsamples
Given the somewhat surprising, but apparently quite robust, ﬁnding that limited
service properties sell for more and sell more quickly than their conventionally-
marketed counterparts, the obvious next step is to explore the reasons for this
counterintuitive result. Direct investigation of those reasons is made more difﬁcult
due to the lack of data on seller characteristics in the MLS. However, proxies for
certain seller characteristics can be constructed using available property and
market attributes. First, the sample is split at the median sale price of the limited
service sample. Then, the same standard hedonic and hazard models given in
Equations (4) and (6), respectively, are employed to uncover any differences in
price or time-on-market impacts across lower and higher price ranges.3 The
differences are quite telling.
The pricing models in Exhibit 6 indicate that the impact from using a limited
service contract is more pronounced in lower-priced properties. The estimated
coefﬁcient for LIM SERVICE in the lower-priced subsample is 3.1% and
statistically signiﬁcant, while the estimated coefﬁcient in the higher-priced
subsample is 1.8% and statistically insigniﬁcant. Conversely, in the time-on-
market models, the estimated coefﬁcient for LIM SERVICE is statistically
insigniﬁcant for the lower-priced subsample, but indicates a statistically signiﬁcant
21.3% decrease in marketing time in the higher-priced subsample.
Owners of more expensive homes would presumably have higher incomes and
higher opportunity costs of devoting time to selling their homes. Thus, in order
to sell the property more quickly, these high opportunity cost owners are willing
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obtained using conventional residential brokerage arrangements. In this scenario,
limited service brokerage offers the added beneﬁt that, by avoiding the selling
commission, these seemingly impatient owners do not have to wait for as high an
offer to be equally as well off with regard to net proceeds. This potential
explanation of the observed differences across price ranges leaves open the
question of why high opportunity cost owners would initially choose limited
service brokerage.
Limited Service Impacts in Hot and Cold Markets
The sample sizes provided in Exhibit 7 show that many more sample properties
sold in the year leading up to the market peak than in the year following the
market peak. Assuming that the higher-priced homes referenced above also
contain a greater quantity of desirable features, a potential explanation for high
opportunity cost owners to initially choose limited service brokerage becomes
clear. Simply put, the owners of these homes with greater quantities of desirable
features were reasonably sure they could sell the homes without signiﬁcant effort.4
If sellers have sufﬁcient and justiﬁed conﬁdence in their ability to effect a sale,
limited service brokerage becomes more attractive because the nominal level of
opportunity cost is decreasing even if opportunity costs relative to similar owners
utilizing conventional brokerage are constant.
The results from the pricing models in Exhibit 7 indicate that limited service
properties sold for more than conventionally-marketed properties, on average, both
before and after the market peak in the summer of 2006. The price impact from
limited service usage is larger after the market peak (6.3%) than before the peak
(3.3%), although both are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. It may be the case that
sellers of homes with greater quantities of desirable features (i.e., more conﬁdent
sellers) are in a better relative bargaining position after the market slowdown.
Alternatively, if market prices are decreasing rapidly enough, it may be the case
that the shorter time-on-market for relatively expensive limited service properties
is contributing to this result.
The time-on-market models in Exhibit 7 report no difference in marketing times
related to the use of limited service brokerage either before or after the market
peak. This is a rare occurrence of a good ‘‘no result.’’ Given the seller conﬁdence
argument put forth above, it is easy to envision a scenario in which the overall
time-on-market results are being driven by a relatively small number of quick
sales in the hottest part of the market. This does not appear to be the case. Instead,
since LIM SERVICE is insigniﬁcant both before and after the market peak, it
would seem that limiting the sample to a sufﬁciently short timeframe reduces the
variability in DOM to the point that the LIM SERVICE effect disappears.
 Conclusion
As limited service brokerage arrangements become increasingly common,
questions about their price and time-on-market impacts will also become more560  Benefield, Pyles, and Gleason
urgent for both sellers of real property and brokers engaged to sell real property.
In addition, given the number of states that have passed, or are considering,
minimum service legislation, which mandates a lower limit on the number and
level of services that can be offered, rigorous inquiry into limited service
brokerage is necessary. Using a sample of 15,038 sold properties from a medium-
sized East Coast MSA collected from September 1, 2005 through August 31,
2007, this study provides an early step towards a better understanding of limited
service brokerage arrangements.
Contrary to expectations, full sample results indicate that properties using a limited
service listing arrangement sell for signiﬁcantly more, and sell signiﬁcantly faster,
than those marketed using more traditional brokerage arrangements. These initial
results include controls for possible bias due to choice of limited service brokerage
and due to sample inclusion, which is a new addition to the real estate literature.
The increased price and shorter marketing time are robust to the use of a ﬁrm-
clustered standard error model and a matched sample.
To further explore this unexpected relationship, the sample is divided according
to price and date of sale. The ﬁndings in the price subsamples indicate that more
expensive homes listed via limited service arrangements sell more quickly than
otherwise similar expensive homes, while less expensive homes using limited
service contracts do not sell more quickly than otherwise similar less expensive
homes. Results for the price subsamples further indicate that less expensive limited
service properties experience a positive price impact versus other less expensive
properties; this result is not present for more expensive limited service properties.
When combined, it would seem that owners of more expensive homes, who would
presumably have higher incomes and higher opportunity costs of selling, are
willing to accept a price identical to that obtained through traditional brokerage
in order to sell the property more quickly and avoid incurring additional
opportunity costs. The reduced brokerage fees for limited service usage mean that
these high opportunity sellers can accept the same price as another seller using
traditional brokerage and still be at least as well off ﬁnancially.
The results in the subsamples formed by date of sale reveal that limited service
properties sold for a higher price than otherwise similar homes under traditional
brokerage arrangements both before and after the market peak in the summer of
2006. No time on market effect is apparent during either the hot market leading
up to the summer of 2006, or in the decidedly cooler market afterwards. Since a
control for the number of homes sold in the same month as the subject is included
in all models, the limited service impact cannot be attributed simply to selling at
a particularly ‘‘hot’’ time during the sample period.
In short, despite anecdotal evidence that limited service brokerage leads to lower
prices and extended marketing times, results of this study indicate exactly the
opposite: higher prices and shorter marketing times for limited service contracts.
These price and time-on-market impacts are inﬂuenced by the value of the
property and the state of the local market. It should also be noted that theSale Price, Marketing Time, and Limited Service  561
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data are drawn from a very unique time period—the two years immediately
surrounding a real estate market peak. It could very well be the case that the
overall market conditions prevailing during that time exerted some inﬂuence on
the reported results. Thus, future studies should be undertaken in which the sample
period does not include a market peak.
 Endnotes
1 Limited service brokers should not be confused with discount brokers, who offer full-
service brokerage at a lower commission than the prevailing rate for a given geographic
area.
2 Calculation of both ATYP and DOP ﬁrst requires that hedonically suggested prices be
obtained for each sample property. Since results from this model are not reported
elsewhere, the full model used to obtain the necessary hedonically suggested prices for
use in the ATYP and DOP calculations is LnORIGLP  0  1LnSF  2LnAGE 
3BED2  4BED4  5BATH3  6HBATH  7FP  8NC  9MULTI-STORY 
10BRICK  11ELEV BASE  12CRAWL  13CPORT  14GAR1 15GAR2 
16IRRIG  17POOL  18GOLF  19FOREST  20WATER  21DOCK 
33 i22
iSCHOOL  jQUARTER  45AGENT-OWNED  .
44 j34
3 More price range categories were considered, but the data are insufﬁcient to allow ﬁner
delineations.
4 As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, the argument that homes with a greater
number of desirable features should be easier to sell hints at some portion of the limited
service brokerage premium being more closely related to the Forgey, Rutherford, and
Springer (1996) liquidity premium. Two facts would seem to counter this concern. First,
recall that the Forgey, Rutherford, and Springer results support the use of expected
marketing time as a proxy for atypicality; that is, increased atypicality is closely
associated with an extended marketing time. In this sample, a relatively large proportion
of sample limited service listings are highly atypical and should, therefore, have small
liquidity premia. Second, the results are actually somewhat stronger in the matched
sample analysis, which should all but eliminate the effect of any liquidity premium.
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